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Analysis of changes in the retirement 
insurance system in Poland in 2002–2018
Abstract
The year 1999 marked the beginning of reforms in social insurance in Poland. Changes 
which were implemented then regarded mainly retirement insurance. Until the reform 
was introduced, the retirement insurance had operated under a pay-as-you-go system. 
However, political changes in Poland, as well as adverse demographic trends, led to inef-
fective functioning of the existing system of financing liabilities arising from retirement 
insurance. It was necessary to introduce changes that, above all, would allow for main-
taining an appropriate level of retirement pension. The following article concentrates on 
one selected aspect of this insurance – Open Pension Funds (in Polish: Otwarte Fundusze 
Emerytalne; OFEs) and presents major changes occurring in 2002–2018, their reasons and 
effects. The analysis is mainly based on data from the Financial Supervision Authority and 
the Social Insurance Institution.
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Analiza zmian w systemie ubezpieczeń emerytalnych 
w Polsce w latach 2002–2018
Streszczenie
W 1999 r. w Polsce rozpoczęto reformowanie ubezpieczeń społecznych. Zmiany, które 
wówczas zostały wprowadzone, w bardzo dużym zakresie dotyczyły ubezpieczenia eme-
rytalnego. Do momentu przeprowadzenia reformy ubezpieczenie emerytalne było reali-
zowane w systemie repartycyjnym. Jednak przemiany ustrojowe w Polsce, a także nieko-
rzystne trendy demograficzne spowodowały, że przyjęty dotychczas sposób finansowania 
świadczeń z tytułu ubezpieczenia emerytalnego przestał sprawnie działać. Konieczne było 
wprowadzenie zmian, które przede wszystkim pozwoliłyby na utrzymanie odpowiedniej 
wysokości świadczenia emerytalnego. Artykuł koncentruje się na jednym wybranym 
aspekcie tego ubezpieczenia – Otwartych Funduszach Emerytalnych, przedstawiając naj-
ważniejsze zmiany w latach 2002–2018, ich przyczyny i skutki. Zaprezentowana w artykule 
analiza została oparta głównie na danych Komisji Nadzoru Finansowego oraz Zakładu 
Ubezpieczeń Społecznych.
Słowa kluczowe: ubezpieczenia, ubezpieczenia emerytalne, emerytury
Kody klasyfikacji JEL: H55, G52
Identifying the problem
Reforms in social insurance adopted in Poland in 1999 was a radical change of 
the existing system. Most fundamental and most difficult changes regarded retire-
ment insurance. An all-public model was abolished in favor of a mixed public-pri-
vate model, in which private bodies emerged and took responsibility for future pen-
sion benefits.
Following the political changes in Poland (i.e., after the transition from socialism 
to capitalism and the introduction of free-market principles) which began in 1989, 
the government embarked on reforming most areas of social and economic life. Ini-
tial changes regarding social insurance were implemented as early as 1990. One needs 
to notice that during the period of the Polish People’s Republic (1945–1989) the social 
insurance sector was centrally managed, and its daily running was entrusted to the 
Social Insurance Institution (in Polish: Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych; ZUS). Pen-
sion insurance was mandatory for most of the society, i.e., all employees and their 
families (excluding some occupational groups, e.g., soldiers; pension insurance for 
farmers was a separate issue, too) (Decree of 1954, art. 1–3, 6). At first, provisions 
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were financed with national funds, which were amassed by means of contributions 
payable by workers’ employment place. In 1986, for that purpose, a separate Social 
Insurance Fund (in Polish: Fundusz Ubezpieczeń Społecznych; FUS) was established 
(Act of 1986, art. 25). However, until 1999 there was no distribution of social secu-
rity contributions for particular types of insurance, and its amount was not allocated 
to those individually insured (Fandrejewska, 2011).
Poland was struggling with rampant inflation in the first phase of its economic 
transformation (1989–1997). A substantial number of workplaces was liquidated, and 
the unemployment rate began to rise steadily. In order to limit the adverse effects of 
those changes, employees of companies in difficulty were given an opportunity to 
take early retirement (Ordinance of 1989). The same option was available to employ-
ees dismissed for other reasons (Ordinance of 1990). It all generated a significant rise 
in the number of pensioners and added to deterioration in the balance between the 
number of the insured and those who received pensions. The pay-as-you-go insurance 
system (operating on the principle of defined indemnity), which was then adopted 
in Poland, ceased to function effectively and properly perform its role.
In addition, demographic forecasts were unfavorable. Further functioning of 
retirement insurance being financed in such a way was impossible because it would 
have led to a considerable decrease in pension payouts or increased contributions 
towards retirement insurance. It would possibly have called for increased subsidies 
from the national budget. Therefore, the proposed reform of the pension system 
was supposed to provide the appropriate level of retirement benefits and – through 
a change in funding – relief to the national budget.
Eventually, the system implemented in 1999 was based on three options of put-
ting aside financial means towards future pensions, which were labeled as “pillars.” 
The first pillar continued the existing public system based on the redistribution prin-
ciple. Within the second pillar (belonging to the capital component), open pension 
funds (in Polish: Otwarte Fundusze Emerytalne; OFEs) were established, into which 
a part of pensionable dues was obligatorily paid (more in: Czechowska 2002: 42–43). 
In turn, the third pillar was based on voluntary forms of retirement insurance.
Regulations concerning OFEs were amended many times, but the essential changes 
regulating the operations of OFEs and participation in the second pillar were intro-
duced in 2013. Since then, the operations of OFEs have changed their character, and 
the number of members joining the funds has dropped significantly.
The main objective of the study was to present changes in OFE operations and 
their reasons and social and economic effects with a particular emphasis on the 
period since 2014. After two decades of OFEs in operations, one should question if 
those bodies appropriately performed tasks they had been allocated. The following 
52 Kinga Stęplewska 
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
article consists of three parts. In the first one, the reader can find the most funda-
mental information on pension funds and legal changes regarding their operations. 
In the next section, the author focuses on data analysis depicting the condition 
of OFEs in the period under scrutiny. In the final part, one can find the author’s 
conclusions. The study analyses the period between 2002 and 2018. The analysis 
is mainly based on data from the Financial Supervision Authority and the Social 
Insurance Institution.
Some facts on Open Pension Funds (OFEs)  
and the essential changes concerning their operations
As the law stands – a pension fund is a legal person whose objectives are accu-
mulating financial means and investing it to pay it out to pension funds’ members 
on taking retirement (Act of 1997, art. 2). A fund is established exclusively by a pen-
sion society as open, employee, or voluntary.
Because of the nature of this study, its further sections are restricted to the pres-
entation and analysis of only open pension funds. These funds operate mainly under 
two Acts: Social Security System Act (13.10.1998) and the Organization and Oper-
ation of Pension Funds Act (28.08.1997). The Open Pension Fund is established 
and managed for a fee by the General Pension Society (PTE; in Polish: Powszechne 
Towarzystwo Emerytalne). An open pension fund then constitutes a collection of 
individual pension accounts. On the other hand, a pension society is a financial insti-
tution managing the fund, which charges a fee from OFE members (more in: Góra, 
2011: 3; Wieteska, 2011: 46). The Polish Financial Supervision Authority maintains 
supervision over pension funds’ and pension funds societies’ activities (in Polish: 
Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego; KNF) (Act of 2006).
Ever since OFEs were established (1999), many crucial changes concerning their 
operations have been implemented. Some of the legal acts imposing those major 
changes include the Act of 25 March 2011 and 6 December 2013. It must be noted 
that a thorough makeover of the capital pension system was initiated by the Act of 
2013, which took effect on 1 February 2014. Under this Act, some OFEs assets were 
transferred to ZUS, and changes were made to the principles for joining OFEs, invest-
ment policy, amounts of contributions payable to OFEs, and fees charged by the PTE 
(Nowicki, 2014: 14; Matyjaszyk, 2016: 68).
53Analysis of changes in the retirement insurance system in Poland in 2002–2018...
Vol. 8, No. 1, 2021
Changes regarding participation in OFEs
Initially, participation in OFEs was mandatory for all people entering the job 
market as well as those already employed and born after 31 December 1968 (more 
in: Muszalski, 2004: 172–180). In accordance with the then binding rules, part of 
pension contribution was obligatorily transferred to OFEs. However, in 2014, by the 
new law, 51.5% of every member’s accounting units were remitted (prearranged in the 
order according to the type of assets) and transferred to ZUS (i.e., PLN 153.15 bn) 
(Act of 2013, art. 16, 23; Niżnik, 2016: 356). Those changes were widely discussed 
and found many supporters as well as opponents. The supporters pointed out the 
necessity for such changes for the sake of public finances, whereas the opponents 
regarded that as taking over private money without its owners’ consent.
Under the Act of 2013, the new insured were no longer obliged to join OFEs. 
However, every existing member had the right to opt for allocating part of their 
contribution to OFEs. Mandatory allocation of members’ contributions was in force 
until 30 June 2014, and the insured who wanted to continue saving up in OFEs had 
to make a suitable declaration. Meanwhile, existing OFE members remained ones 
in terms of contributions that were not remitted in 2014, and voluntariness concerned 
only further distribution of pension contribution. In case an insured individual did 
not make a declaration about allocating their contributions to a given OFE, these 
contributions were recorded in their subaccounts in ZUS (Nowicki, 2014: 22; Szybur-
ska-Walczak, 2015: 157; Act with amendments of 1998, 21–22, art. 39 and 39b). The 
insured had the possibility of changing the investment method between their OFE 
and ZUS for the first time from 1 April 2014 to 31 July 2014 and then in the same 
period of 2016 (following changes were possible every four years). In total, in 2014 
and 2016, declarations about allocating part of pension contributions to OFEs were 
signed by 16% of all OFE members (KNF(b), 2017: 17).
In accordance with present-day regulations, obtaining membership takes effect 
on signing an agreement with an OFE (or Act with amendments of 1997, art. 128). In 
contrast, OFEs must not refuse to sign an agreement with any person who expressed 
a wish to do so and complies with requirements stated in regulations on the social 
insurance system. A given person may be a member of one OFE only. A person 
accessing retirement insurance has four months (as of the date when insurance lia-
bility was accepted) before their decision to conclude an agreement with an OFE (Act 
with amendments of 1997, art. 81; Act with amendments of 1998 art. 39).
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Amounts of members’ contributions allocated to OFEs
The amount of contributions allocated to OFEs has been changed several times. 
Initially, OFEs received 7.3% of the contribution base (legal act, 1998, art. 22). Since 
2011 under the amendment to the Act on social insurance scheme, an OFE received 
3.5% of the contribution base, and 3.8% (Act of 2011, art. 7) was recorded in subac-
counts in ZUS.2 The reason for those changes – indicated by the legislator – was the 
increasing national debt brought about by allocating part of contributions to OFEs, 
which resulted in shortfalls in FUS, which, in turn, were eased by the national budget. 
Seeking changes in this respect, but at the same time aiming at maintaining a decent 
level of future benefits, the legislator decided to reallocate part of the contribution 
to a special subaccount in ZUS. Therefore, less financial means was being transferred 
to an OFE, and the remaining part of the contribution was deposited in an individ-
ual subaccount in ZUS (Nowicki, 2014: 12). Finally, in 2014 the level of contribution 
was set at 2.92%.3 It must be observed that the amount of financial means amassed 
by every insured individual in their account in OFEs influences future benefits paid 
out as a funded pension. The defined premium principle, introduced as part of the 
reform, implies that the benefit depends on the amount of contributions accumu-
lated by an insurant throughout the period of insurance (Klimkiewicz, 2010: 28).
Changes to the structure of the OFE investment portfolio
The 1997 Act clearly defined the allocation of pension funds’ assets, indicating the 
categories of deposits, their levels, and limits. In effect, funds were obliged to invest 
mainly in so-called safe securities (e.g., bonds and other debt securities guaranteed 
by the State Treasury or the National Bank of Poland). Investing money in more risky 
securities, i.e., stocks and shares, was restricted by law (Act of 1997, art. 139–156; 
Zimny, 2011: 175). The above-mentioned arrangements secured safety but at the 
same time affected profitability (more in: Czechowska, 2002: 51).
Changes concerning OFEs’ allocation policy introduced in 2014 were meant 
to create a truly market-like character of the pension system. The amount of raised 
assets depends on the PTE’s investment decisions, which was granted a possibility 
2 As of 2011 ZUS held subaccounts, administered and managed by ZUS, which operate just like 
accounts in OFEs (more in: Nowicki, 2014: 5).
3 In a subaccount in ZUS the remaining part is recorded, i.e., 4.38% or the whole amount, i.e., 7.3% 
– in case a contribution is not allocated to an OFE (Act of 2013, art. 5, pt. 3).
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of investing money into instruments with higher returns on assets but encumbered 
with higher risks as well. Such decisions aimed to improve effectiveness and increase 
the competitive edge between various OFEs (cf. Nowicki, 2014: 16).
It needs to be stressed that, contrary to prior guidelines, the Act of 2013 imposed 
a complete ban on investing OFE assets into treasury stocks, which forced a huge 
change in the way the PTE invested the funds’ assets (Nowicki, 2014: 18; Act of 2013, 
art. 4, pt. 25). Hence, a situation was avoided when a substantial part of the contribu-
tion transferred to OFEs was earmarked for purchasing treasury stocks and thus, indi-
rectly added to increasing the public debt (Michalski, 2011: 27). Moreover, to ensure 
OFE assets’ security on the stock exchange, the legislator made a provision about 
a gradual decrease in limits on investments in stocks until the limits were removed 
in 2018 (since 2014–75%, next – 55%, 35%, 15%). Also, the restrictions on deposits 
from abroad were lifted, but there were introduced limits on investing assets into 
deposits denominated in foreign currencies (2014–10%, next – 20%, 30%) (Act of 
2013; art. 35, KNF(b), 2014: 4). OFEs were allowed to offer in their portfolios treas-
ury stocks, bonds issued by Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK) before 4 Febru-
ary 2016, however, on condition that they were purchased before 4 February 2014 
and were not transferred to ZUS (KNF(b), 2017: 36).
OFEs were still obliged to provide maximum safety and profitability on deposits 
as OFEs were still to carry out activities within the scope of social insurance (Now-
icki, 2014: 16; Act of 1997 with amendments, art. 139).
Running costs of OFEs
Running costs of OFEs include a distribution fee – deducted from monthly con-
tributions and the management fee payable to the PTE. Initially, the legal Act did not 
determine any limit to the distribution fee, which resulted in some OFEs charging over 
9% for it. The management fee was fixed at 0.05% net assets of the fund under man-
agement per month. In 2004, the legislators introduced a limit to the distribution fee 
at 7%, in 2010 at 3.5%, and in 2014 at 1.75%, respectively (Act of 1997, art. 134; Act 
of 2009, art. 1; Act of 2013, art. 20, pt. 20; Niżnik, 2016: 353–354). The management 
fees were changed in 2004, and their monthly amount was decided to be dependent on 
the net level of OFE assets (Act of 2003, art. 1, pt. 55). In addition, a fee was laid down 
to accompany opening a surplus account. The fee depended on the fund’s investment 
results, the value of the assets, and the rate of return (more in: Niżnik, 2016: 354).
For the clients, the management fee is particularly important as it is paid with the 
fund’s assets, which lowers the net value of the assets and directly affects the value of 
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an accounting unit (VAU) and the rate of return. On the other hand, the distribution 
fee is a charge before the contribution is converted into accounting units; hence, the 
amount of this fee does not impact directly the net value of assets and the fund’s rate 
of return. That means, however, that the rate of return of an individual member is 
lower than the rate of return of a given OFE (Zimny, 2011: 174; Act of 1997, art. 134).
Until 2011 in case of changing OFEs, a member had to pay a transfer fee, and 
the management fee included the costs of acquisition, which in 2012 was prohib-
ited. From then on, membership agreements have been signed by correspondence 
exclusively (Act of 2011, art. 4, pts. 21, 22, 29).
The method of establishing charges and their volume came under criticism, as 
those charges, especially in the initial period of OFE operations, presented a huge 
expense for the insured. By deciding on a given method of calculating management 
fees, the legislators secured a regular income for the PTE (more in: Wieteska, 2011: 
41, 44; Michalski, 2011: 17–22). Hence, in the following years, a suggestion was put 
forward to make changes regarding charges and a proposal to transfer part of the 
contribution to ZUS, which was adopted in 2014 (cf. Michalski, 2011: 22–23).
Other changes
The amendment of 2013 changed the principles of pension payout with regard 
to its capital part. In accordance with initial provisions of the Act on social insur-
ance system, pension payout was to be made through retirement insurance institu-
tions (Act of 1997, art. 111). Finally, ZUS became the subject institution carrying out 
a retirement institution’s tasks. It was exclusively entitled to make retirement pay-
ments from the first and second pillars. To provide extra security against unfavorable 
fluctuations on the capital market, a provision was put forward saying that ten years 
prior to reaching the retirement age, ZUS stops transferring contributions to a given 
OFE, with the financial means being recorded in sub-accounts. At the same time, the 
OFE begins remitting accounting units and transferring financial resources to FUS 
(so-called security slide) (Act of 2013, art. 4, pts. 13–16, 5, pts. 3–4). However, on 
retirement, the total capital assembled in the OFE is transferred to ZUS or the national 
budget. In the first three years after the introduction of the amendments (from Octo-
ber 2014 to September 2017), OFEs transferred PLN 1,404 bn (KNF(b), 2014: 17).
Particularly essential for the volume of pension benefits was a change regarding 
the retirement age. In 2013 a process leading to the extension of the retirement age 
to 67 years of age (for both women and men) was started. At that time, the retirement 
age stood at 60 and 65 years of age, respectively. The new retirement age for men was 
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supposed to come into effect in 2020 and in the case of women in 2040 (Act of 2012, 
art. 1). However, the amendment to the Act, which took effect on 1 October 2017, 
reintroduced the previous retirement age ruling, i.e., 60 years of age for women and 
65 years of age for men (Act of 2016, art. 1).
The analysis of the situation of OFEs in 2002–2018 
based on numerical data
In order to illustrate ongoing changes in the OFE market, the following analysis 
contains data on the number of funds, funds’ members, and accounts kept by the 
funds. Later on, an analysis is performed on financial data: amounts and numbers 
of contributions, net assets level, accounting units’ value, rate of return, and struc-
tures of investment portfolios. This analysis touches upon 2002 to 2018 (for a bet-
ter presentation, the author focuses on 2-year intervals). The data presenting given 
funds are based on a 2018 listing of funds (considering name changes and takeovers 
happening in previous years). In contrast, general data in the subsequent years refer 
to the summation of volumes yielded by funds operating in a given year (they do 
not represent the summation of the presented data).
For a better understanding of developments, the economic situation in Poland is 
discussed in brief. From 2002 to 2007, the economic situation in Poland was good. 
Poland witnessed a steady rise in GDP (from 2% in 2002 to 7% in 2007, an economic 
slowdown to 3.5% took place in 2005). The global economic crisis, which happened 
after 2007, affected Poland, too. An upward trend in GDP was maintained, but its 
growth rate clearly dropped (from 7.4% in the 1st quarter of 2007 to 2.9% in the 
4th quarter of 2008). In the following years, one could notice an economic revival 
(in 2018, GDP went up to 5.1%).
A crisis in the financial markets adversely affected the investment performance 
of financial institutions, including OFEs. In the period in question, the growth in net 
assets of the funds was slower than in the previous years despite higher contribu-
tions transferred to OFEs. Considerable falls in stock indices caused drops in units 
of account. In effect, pension funds in the period 2006–2009 yielded negative rates 
of return. An improvement in the stock market began in 2009, which led to increases 
in funds’ net assets.
The labor market situation in the period under study was improving steadily, and 
the unemployment rate between 2002–2018 showed a downward trend. Neverthe-
less, its level fluctuated over given time-periods. Between 2002 and 2005 the unem-
ployment rate (registered one) in Poland amounted to 18%–20% and from 2003 
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showed a downward trend (2006–15%, 2008–9.5%, 2012–13.4%, 2018–6%). A rela-
tively favorable situation on the labor market in the period 2006–2009, as well as a fall 
in the unemployment rate, resulted in an increase in the value of contributions sub-
mitted to OFEs (KNF(b), 2009: 4, 6; 2011: 4, 5; 2014: 6; 2017: 5; 2018: 5; GUS, 2018b).
The number of operating funds in the period in question
In 2002 in Poland, there were 17 OFEs in operation. In the following years, 
one could observe a decrease in their number – in 2004: 15, 2008: 14, 2014: 12, 
and in 2018: 10. In the period under scrutiny, there were changes in the ownership 
structure (takeovers, mergers), which led to changes in open pension funds’ names.
In 2018 the following OFEs were in operation: Nationale-Nederlanden OFE (NN), 
Generali OFE (Generali), PKO BP Bankowy OFE (PKO), OFE PZU “Złota Jesień” 
(PZU), Aviva OFE Aviva Santander (Aviva), AEGON OFE (Aegon), AXA OFE (AXA), 
Allianz Polska OFE (Allianz), MetLife OFE (MetLife), OFE Pocztylion (Pocztylion).
Change in the number of OFE members




























Source: own work based on data from the KNF.
The number of OFE members rose steadily until 2014 (compared to the num-
ber in 2002, it grew by 51%), and in 2016 and 2018, there was a fall in the OFE 
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membership (Figure 1). A considerable increase in 2008 compared to 2006 (by 
12%) resulted from a rising number of employees who, at the same time, fell under 
the obligatory social insurance. Since the obligatory OFE membership was waived 
(in 2014), there has been a steady drop in the membership numbers because, on the 
one hand, a low percentage of people decided to become a member of an OFE and, 
on the other hand, people left OFEs due to reaching their retirement age, death or 
abandoning the system (KNF(b), 2014: 6, 16; 2017: 5, 16).










NN Aviva PZU AEGON MetLife
AXA Allianz Generali PKO Pocztylion
Source: own work based on data from the KNF.
According to data from KNF(a), in 2002, almost a quarter of OFE members 
belonged to Aviva, 17% belonged to NN, and 16% belonged to PZU. In 2010 NN 
Fund came into the lead and stayed there till 2018 (20% in 2010 and 19% in the fol-
lowing years). As for Aviva Fund, its share diminished to 17% in 2012 and to 16% in 
the following years. PZU Fund had its lowest share in 2014 and 2016 (13%), but in 
2018 it sprang back to 16% (after taking over Pekao OFE). In 2018 essential shares 
in the total number of OFE members belonged to Aegon and MetLife (Figure 2).
The number of accounts kept by OFEs
Until 2014 there had been a steady growth in the number of accounts in OFEs 
from 11.5 million to 17 million (i.e., by 49%). Taking into account biyearly changes, 
the highest increase of 12% was recorded in 2008 (compared to 2006). Later on (2016 
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and 2018), the number of accounts fell (to 16.2 million in 2018), which resulted from 
amendments in the legislation.
Throughout the period under scrutiny, there were three OFEs with the most sub-
stantial numbers of accounts: Aviva, NN, and PZU. In 2008 Aviva held 2.9 million 
accounts; in the same year, NN and PZU held 2.8 million and 2.1 million accounts, 
respectively. In 2010 the leading fund was NN (3 million, Aviva – 2.8 million, PZU 
– 2.3 million accounts). Among those three funds, there were very little fluctuations 
in the number of accounts. The majority of the remaining funds behaved likewise. 
Huge changes took place only in Allianz in 2014 and Aegon in 2018, which resulted 
from takeovers that these funds made (Figure 3). The percentage of inactive (dead) 
accounts (i.e., those which did not receive any contributions) showed a falling trend: 
from 18% in 2002 to 0.7% in 2018 (KNF(a)).























































Source: own work based on data from the KNF.
The difference between the number of OFE members registered by ZUS and the 
number of accounts in OFEs stemmed from different forms of members’ registra-
tion, including inactive accounts (GUS, 2018b: 1).
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Sums and the number of pension contributions 
transferred to OFE by ZUS
In Figure 4 depicting aggregated data for sums and the number of contribu-
tions, one should notice a clear upward trend in the sums of transferred contribu-
tions until 2010. In total, in the year 2010, 22.2 million zlotys (PLN) was transferred 
to OFEs. In 2011 there was a drop of 33%. The most considerable decline of 89% 
in comparison to 2010 took place in 2015. After that year, the funds noted a slow 
growth in the following years. The highest number of contributions was handed over 
in 2013 (175.9 million), and the lowest one in 2017 (27.6 million).











































sums of contributions (in PLN millions) number of contributions (in million items)
Source: own work based on data from the KNF and ZUS.
The decline after 2011 resulted mainly from a change in the level of contributions. 
Also, from July 2014, OFEs received contributions only from members who signed 
suitable declarations; in addition, from February 2014, “security slide” regulations 
took effect. For the first time resources under security, slide regulations were handed 
over in the last quarter of 2014 (for the period starting in February of that year) in the 
total amount of PLN 3.7 bn (i.e., 2.3% of OFEs’ net assets, as of September 2014). In 
turn, lowering the retirement age in 2017 immediately produced a group of pension-
ers and applying a “security slide” to additional younger members (KNF(b), 2014: 
19; 2017: 19, 20, 21). A more detailed analysis of data from the KNF(a) discloses that 
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the leading position in terms of the sums of contributions transferred was taken by 
Aviva, NN, and PZU, whose share in 2002 and 2018 amounted to 29% and 19%, 21% 
and 29%; 14% and 12%, respectively.
Funds’ net assets, the value of accounting units,  
and the rate of return
A fund’s assets include members’ contributions and, on account of that, obtained 
rights and other benefits. On the other hand, net assets are assets reduced by funds’ 
payables. The value of accounting units is calculated with relation to net assets (it is 
the ratio of net assets to the number of units recorded on a given day in accounts held 
by a particular fund). In turn, the rate of return, according to art. 172 in the Act of 
1997 (incl. amendments), is determined in percentage as the quotient of the differ-
ence between the VAU on the last day of the billing month and the VAU on the last 
day of the billing month prior to the 36-month period to the VAU on the last day of 
the billing month prior to the 36-month period. The billing months are March and 
September, respectively (initially, it was a 24-month period including quarters, since 
2004 – it has been a 36-month period). The VAU then shows a percentage change 
in the value of the accounting unit and illustrates the profitability of investments 
made by an OFE in a particular period of time. A supervising body fixed the mini-
mal rate of return as the weighted average rate of return for all the funds which they 
yielded in a specific period of time (Czechowska, 2002: 46; Zimny, 2011: 174, 176). 
Since 2014 the minimal rate of return has not been in force. However, the effectiv-
ity system still relies on the weighted average rate of return and the periodic rate of 
return (Nowicki, 2014: 18; KNF(c), 2016: 1).
All the funds’ net assets in 2002 amounted to over PLN 31 bn, and till 2012, they 
noted a steady increase. The strongest growths occurred in 2004 and 2006 (in the 
analyzed period) (98%, 89%, compared to 2002 and 2004). A decline in the rate of 
growth in assets in the following period resulted from a crisis in financial markets, 
which negatively affected OFEs’ investment results. The stock markets’ situation began 
to improve in February 2009 (KNF(b), 2009 and 2011: 18). The biggest decline took 
place in 2014, when, compared to 2012, net assets plunged by 45%, which happened 
because of transferring some means to ZUS. The following years saw a slow growth (3%).
The three biggest (in terms of contribution sums) open pension funds amassed 
together net assets of PLN 20.5 bn in 2002. They reached the top level of assets in 2012 
– PLN 161.4 bn, and in 2018 – PLN 96.4 bn, which equaled: 65%, 60%, 61% of all 
assets, respectively (Figure 5).
63Analysis of changes in the retirement insurance system in Poland in 2002–2018...
Vol. 8, No. 1, 2021

























Net assets in total Aviva NN PZU
Source: own work based on data from the KNF.
Figure 6.  The value of accounting unit (as of 31 December of each year) and the weighted 
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in PLN
* Weighted average of WJR for OFEs operating in a given year
NN Generali PKO PZU
Aviva AXA Allianz
MetLife Pocztylion Weighted  average*
Source: own work based on data from the KNF.
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In Figure 6, one can see the VAU at the end of each year under scrutiny for funds 
operating in 2018 and the weighted average for all OFEs operating in a given year. In 
each year in question, the highest end-of-year value of VAU was achieved by NN. One 
needs to note an upward trend for VAU in respective OFEs (a decrease was noticeable 
only in 2008). In December 2018, the weighted average for VAU stood at PLN 41.74, 
which was 163% higher than in 2002. In that month, the highest VAU was achieved 
by NN at PLN 44.19, and the lowest by Pocztylion – PLN 37.67.
Table 1.  The weighted average for the rate of return for all OFEs in a 36‑month period 
(as of the end of September)
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
The weighted average for the 
3‑year rate of return (%) ‑ 26.9 22.9 12.58 3.36 19.28 31.99 0.13 18.83
Source: own work based on data from the KNF and GUS.
The rate of return, which illustrates the profitability of OFE investments in a given 
period of time, held various values (Table 1). The lowest figures were noted in 2016, 
and the highest ones in 2014. 2016 witnessed a clear deterioration in financial results 
(they were lower only during the crisis when the weighted average in the years 2006–
2009 stood at –2.93%). In the years under scrutiny, three-year rates of return stood 
at medium or, in some periods, very low levels, which reveals that their cost-effec-
tiveness was low. One should observe that this paper points out only the weighted 
average in a 36-month period (calculated in the month of September). However, 
assumptions regarding OFEs were based on long-term savings. Therefore, this indi-
cator does not fully illustrate OFEs’ effectiveness. For a more accurate picture, one 
could use weighted averages for longer periods, e.g., the weighted average of the rate 
of return for all OFEs in a 120-month period (from September 2007 until Septem-
ber 2017) stood at 57.5% (KNF(b), 2009: 22, 2017: 3).
While assessing the effectiveness of OFEs, one also needs to stress the impor-
tance of the PTE in the management of OFEs’ financial means. The societies were 
established to multiply responsibly and professionally the financial means of future 
pensioners. Instead, they became (especially at the beginning of their functioning) 
a heavy burden in terms of management fees deducted from OFEs’ assets and com-
missions on members’ contributions (more in: Michalski, 2011: 17–22).
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OFE investment portfolios







2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Company stocks, shares, certificates
of investment funds 27.1 33.4 34.8 21.9 36.7 35.3 83.5 83.6 85.6
Bonds and treasury certificates, debt
securities guaranteed by the State
Treasury or the National Bank of
Poland
68.9 59.5 62.4 73.6 56.7 51.5 0.8 0.0 0.0
Bank deposits and bank securities 2.6 4.5 1.9 1.9 3.6 8.1 7.8 8.7 7.4
Other deposits 1.5 2.6 0.8 2.6 2.9 5.0 7.9 7.8 7.0
Source: own work based on data from the KNF.
While analyzing Figure 7, which shows investment portfolios of all OFEs, one 
needs to note a very distinct reorientation in the way OFEs invested their assets, 
which took place as a result of changes in the legislation from 2014 on. Until 2012 
the portfolio had contained mainly securities guaranteed by the State Treasury and 
the National Bank of Poland. During the economic crisis, the amount of investment 
in stocks diminished. Instead, investment in the State Treasury bonds (with a fixed 
interest rate) became more popular. From 2009 until March 2011, there was a grad-
ual growth in the value of stocks and shares up to almost 37%. Hence, the signifi-
cance of OFEs as a participant on the Stock Exchange increased a great deal. How-
ever, OFEs still invested mainly in securities from the State Treasury. In 2011 the 
treasury bonds’ share went down (to 53%), primarily stemming from an investment 
in so-called motorway bonds (issued by the BGK and connected with road projects).
From 2014, due to amendments in the legislative, over 80% of the portfolio 
contained company stocks and shares as well as certificates of investment funds. 
Then, from February 2014, OFEs greatly changed their risk profile because they 
became equity funds with a much higher degree of risk from the capital-protected 
funds. In the subsequent periods, the structure of OFEs’ deposits was dominated by 
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domestic shares. The improvement in the situation on the Warsaw Stock Exchange 
in mid-2016 contributed to an increase in share rating contained in OFEs’ port-
folios and, at the same time, to an increase in the value of those portfolios up to 
nearly PLN 180 bn at the end of September 2017. The shares quoted on the Polish 
market represented 92% of OFEs’ portfolio (KNF(b), 2009: 27, 32; 2011: 28, 33, 34, 
41; 2014: 5, 31, 39; 2017: 32, 33).
Running costs of OFEs
The distribution fee in 2002 ranged from 4% (Aviva) to 9% (Zurich Solidarni 
OFE), and the average fee was 7%. Decreases in that fee in the subsequent years were 
related to changes in the law. In 2004, the average went down to stand at 6.63%. In 
2012, the distribution fee was similar across all OFEs (from 3.4% to 3.5%). From 
2014 the majority of OFEs charged the highest allowed level (i.e., 1.75%), only Aviva 
and PKO charged a lower sum (0.75%, 1.70%).
The total sum of management fees charged in 2002 amounted to PLN 150.7 m, 
and in the following years, there was a steady growth. A monthly charge of funds’ 
net assets for management in 2012 (as of the end of September) ranged from 0.26‰ 
to 0.45‰ and amounted to PLN 1,032.4 m. In 2014 and 2016, the total for management 
fees decreased to PLN 778.21 m (min. 0.367‰) and PLN 694.39 m (min. 0.377‰), 
respectively (Niżnik, 2016: 353; KNF(c), 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018: 4, 5, GUS, 2018b)
Concepts for changes in the retirement system
A project concerning transformations in the retirement system was introduced 
in the Responsible Development Plan (2016), according to which an assumption 
was made to start a savings program dedicated to all employees. Hence, in January 
2019, Employees’ Capital Programs (ECP) were developed, whose aim for the pro-
gram participants is to accumulate savings systematically to receive a benefit pay-
ment on turning 60. Accumulated financial means belong to the ECP participants, 
and the basic contribution payment comes to 2% of their salary (Act of 2018, art. 3, 
27). Participation in the ECP is voluntary. However, withdrawal from the program 
entails submitting a suitable declaration (Act of 2018, art. 23). Financial resources 
amassed within the program are meant to be invested in financial markets.
The ECP s will be formed in stages starting from the biggest employers (as of 
1 July 2019) (Act of 2018, art. 134). Further changes regard transforming OFEs into 
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specialist open investment funds. Under the project of May 2019, savings accumu-
lated in OFEs will be handed over to private individual pensioners’ accounts at the 
beginning of 2020. From then on, ZUS will cease to transfer contributions to OFEs, 
and participants’ payments will be voluntary. However, OFE members will be allowed 
to submit a declaration requesting to move the Demographic Reserve Fund’s finan-
cial means. Societies will hold the individual accounts for Investment Funds, which 
will replace the PTE. Those changes will create a new system, which is also based on 
three pillars, i.e., ZUS, ECP, and individual retirement accounts, but modified ver-
sions of the existing ones (Bankier, 2019; Forbes, 2019).
* * *
Taking into account the socio-economic situation in Poland after 1989, it was 
necessary to adopt reforms in social insurance. Introducing an equity component 
into pension insurance was definitely an essential change, but the following years 
proved that the adopted measures had their shortcomings.
In accordance with the principles of the reform, pension funds were dedicated 
to amassing financial means and to investing them so that in the future, after pension 
funds’ members retire, funds could make payouts to them. Appropriate management 
of the entrusted OFEs’ finance was supposed to multiply them and increase future 
pensions. However, as time went by, it turned out that OFEs did not fulfill their role 
properly, and their profitability is too low.
Several reasons can be ascribed to that. Some of the most important ones are 
as follows: restrictions on methods and levels of investing OFEs’ assets, high run-
ning costs (above all, at the beginning of their operations), a non-existent direct 
connection between the PTE’s revenue and OFEs’ financial results, as well as unfa-
vorable effects of the economic crisis. Those factors prevented OFEs from achiev-
ing expected financial results, and additionally, measures that were adopted added 
to budgetary burdens.
In view of the above, it turned out that correcting the existing ones and implement-
ing new regulations regarding the second pillar became imperative. Profound changes 
were implemented in 2011, and since 2014 OFEs have been operating in a modified 
way. Legal changes eliminated and limited mistakes committed earlier on, and allowed 
for improvements in effective OFEs’ operations, but also led to increased investment 
risk. Moreover, the change in principles regulating membership in OFEs led to a par-
tial shift in responsibility for the level of future pensions onto citizens themselves. At 
the same time, it demonstrated that a small proportion of the insured was interested 
in saving money within OFEs (the majority opted for keeping their pension contribu-
tions in full in ZUS). Further OFEs’ operations in the existing format stopped being 
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reasonable. In compliance with the accepted assumptions, most probably in 2020, 
that is after 20 years in operations, OFEs will go out of business.
The financial status of pensioners in Poland, who rely solely on pension benefits, is 
still very difficult, and the forecasts are not optimistic. While analyzing demographic 
processes, one can expect further aging of the population, and it should be assumed 
that the proportion of the post-productive population in society is likely to increase. 
Such a situation can be accounted for by a decreasing mortality rate, which affects 
average life expectancy, a low birth rate, and negative population growth (GUS, 2010, 
2018a, 2018b), as well as lowering the retirement age.
Forecasts point out that the proportion of the post-productive population in soci-
ety will increase from 21.5% in 2018 to 24% in 2023. On the other hand, the ratio of 
the population in post-productive age to the population in productive age is bound to 
rise to 62% in 2070. (cf. in 2018, it stood at 35%) (ZUS, 2018, 13; Ministry of Finance, 
2019: 32). A 2015 report for the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) (324) pointed out that the return on replacing gross retirement pension 
with earnings of an average employee taking retirement at 67 years of age in Poland 
will stand at 43%. This figure has worsened due to lowering the retirement age and, 
as forecasts say, will amount to 32% for men and 28% for women (OECD, 2017: 101).
To improve such a situation, it is necessary to take further action on pension 
insurance with regard to the second pillar and strengthen the third pillar, which 
is an optional form of putting money aside towards one’s retirement pension. The 
Employees’ Capital Programs that were introduced in 2019 are to increase future 
pensioners’ assets. As a result, an improvement in the pension replacement rate is 
expected to occur (Ministry of Finance, 2019: 32). In addition, it is being planned 
to enhance the third pillar, which is currently used by a small proportion of society 
(in 2018, only 9.5% of people in productive age benefitted from all forms of accu-
mulating funds under the third pillar and referred to in the legislation; data from the 
KNF and ZUS). Transforming OFEs into one of the third-pillar options is believed 
to spark off the development of this pillar. Changes that have recently been imple-
mented can be assessed only in a few years.
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